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LIVENESS, ‘REALITY’ AND THE MEDIATED HABITUS 
FROM TELEVISION TO THE MOBILE PHONE 
 
 
 
Liveness should be interpreted as a development within media history as a whole. . 
. . At the base, the need to connect oneself, with others, to the world’s events, is 
central to the development of the modern nation. (Bourdon, 2000: 551-552) 
 
Media belong to the history of the progressive organization of social life across space 
and time: media, in other words, are part of governmentality, which is not to deny that 
they have many other dimensions too (expression, pleasure, imagination). From 
Durkheim onwards, sociology has been concerned with how social order is enacted, in 
part, through categories of perception and thought. Liveness can be understood as a 
category crucially involved in both naturalising and reproducing a certain historically 
distinctive type of social coordination around media ‘centres’ from which images, 
information and narratives are distributed and (effectively simultaneously) received 
across space. This general context is helpful for understanding the persistence of 
‘liveness’ as a term, and some of the tensions currently surrounding it; even better, 
understanding mediated ‘liveness’ in this way links media debates to wider questions 
about how in media-saturated societies social ‘order’ is possible, to the extent that it 
is; in particular, it links to the possibility of rethinking one concept of ordering, Pierre 
Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’, for mediated societies, a point to which I return. 
 
This approach questions the way ‘liveness’ in media studies debates is generally seen 
as an issue specifically about media texts and the changing conventions and 
interpretations embedded in media production; it insists that larger questions are at 
stake, confirming that the curiosity of media scholars in ‘liveness’ has been well-
placed, but at the same time detaching that term from an exclusive application to one 
specific media technology (usually television). 
 
The Forms of Liveness 
 
An important earlier argument which connected television’s liveness to wider 
sociological questions was Jane Feuer’s paper on ‘The Ideology of Liveness’ (1983). 
Feuer was interested in the ideology of television as a social technology, not the way 
other types of ideology (political, commercial) might be transmitted through 
television: specifically the ‘ideology’ that television connects us ‘live’ to important 
events, so that we see things as they happen. However Feuer’s article ended (1983: 
20-21) with a question about how that ideology is socially reproduced in audiences’ 
use of television texts that remained unanswered. Perhaps this is why analysis of the 
ideological implications of televisual form ceased, for a while, to be central to media 
studies in the 1990s (there were other factors, of course, to do with the rethinking of 
‘ideology’ itself).  
 
The value of Feuer’s work now, however, does not depend on the continued 
acceptability of the term ‘ideology’; indeed things may be clearer without that term. 
The question instead is whether ‘liveness’ (as applied to television and other media) is 
purely a descriptive term, whose usefulness depends on matters of fact, or whether it 
is, in Durkheim’s sense, a ‘category’ – a term whose use depends on its place within a 
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wider system, or structured pattern, of values, which work to reproduce our belief in, 
and assent to, something wider than the description carried by the term itself: in this 
case, media’s role as a central institution for representing social ‘reality’. In a recent 
book (XXXX, 2003) I argued that we can develop Feuer’s insight by interpreting 
liveness as a ritual term, that is, a category put to use in various forms of structured 
action that naturalise wider power relationships; there are many forms of ritualised 
practice in relation to media. But what follows does not depend on that wider 
argument. Instead, I will focus on the claim that ‘liveness’ works as a category 
distinction whose importance is more than purely descriptive.  
 
This is the best way of explaining, I suggest, some striking features of the trajectory 
of the term ‘liveness’ in discourses about media. I mean, first, the substitutability of 
the media involved in liveness (originally radio, then television, increasingly the 
Internet and, in certain respects, the mobile phone); second, the fuzziness permitted 
over how ‘simultaneous’ transmission and reception have to be for ‘liveness’ to be 
achieved (see White, forthcoming); and, third, the persistence of the term ‘liveness’ 
notwithstanding challenges to the paradigms of liveness at particular historical 
moments. These points are connected, so let me explore then in more detial. 
 
In television’s early days, when all programmes were performances broadcast live, 
television was entirely a ‘live’ medium, in the sense of being broadcast as it was 
performed. As the proportion of live performance declined, the term ‘live’ switched 
its reference, while remaining in use. Jerome Bourdon (2000) argues that the 
reference-point of ‘liveness’ shifted to those parts of television which broadcast real 
events as they happen, but this is difficult  to fit with the continued use of ‘liveness’ in 
relation to fictional or semi-fictional programmes, such as soap operas or gamedocs. 
Instead, it is more plausible that the decisive criterion of liveness is not so much the 
factuality of what is transmitted, as the fact of live transmission itself (Ellis, 2000: 
31).  
 
There is, however, a connection to real events built into ‘liveness’, but an indirect one. 
Live transmission (of anything, whether real or fictional) guarantees that someone in 
the transmitting media institution could interrupt it at any time and make an 
immediate connection to real events. What is special, then, about live transmission is 
the potential connection it guarantees with real events. Or at least this is how liveness 
is now generally constructed. Joshua Meyrowitz put this succinctly: 
 
There is a big difference between listening to a cassette tape while driving in a car 
and listening to a radio station, in that the cassette player cuts you off from the 
outside world, while the radio station ties you into it. Even with a local radio 
station, you are ‘in range’ of any news about national and world events. 
(Meyrowitz, 1985: 90) 
 
Liveness – or live transmission - guarantees a potential connection to shared social 
realities as they are happening. 
 
If understood this way, it is no surprise that the category of liveness continues even as 
the set of media technologies to which it is applied expands. Not only does 
television’s ‘liveness’ continue to be emphasised as one of its key selling points more 
than a decade after some argued video recording would mean the end of televisual 
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‘liveness’ (Cubitt, 1991). Liveness now takes new forms which link television to other 
media: to the Internet (as in the much commented upon ‘live’ transmission on the Big 
Brother UK  website of Nick Bateman’s expulsion in 2001, hours before edited 
highlights of the episode could be shown on television: Lawson, 2003) and to the 
mobile phone, as in UK mobile phone companies’ marketing strategies during the 
build-up to the 2001 summer season of reality TV:  
 
ultimately the [enhanced] SMS services may all boil down to the quality of the 
content and characters, not forgetting the giddy excitement that can be generated 
from a message telling Big Brother obsessives of two housemates being in bed 
together – ‘live on the internet now’. (Vickers, 2001) 
 
Because liveness is not a natural category but a constructed term, its significance rests 
not on technological fact, but on a whole chain of ideas:  
 
(1) that we gain access through liveness to something of broader, because ‘central’, 
significance, which is worth accessing now, not later;  
(2) that the ‘we’ who gain live access is not random, but a representative social 
group; 
(3) that the media1 (not some other social mechanism) is the privileged means for 
obtaining that access.  
 
Liveness, in sum, is a category whose use naturalises the general idea that, through 
the media, we achieve a shared attention to the ‘realities’ that matter for us as a 
society.  
 
Liveness’s connection to the media’s reality-claims is hardly accidental. We could say 
a great deal more about the reality claims of television, especially about current forms 
of reality TV which, as we have seen, provide some clear examples of how the 
reference of ‘liveness’ is being stretched (cf XXXX, 2003a, chapter 6). Instead, 
however, I want to discuss how, at the same time as ‘liveness’ is expanding across 
media, its categorical weight is being challenged by potential rival forms of ‘liveness’ 
which are not, or not unambiguously, linked to a mediated social ‘centre’.  
 
When I say rival ‘forms’ of liveness, I do not mean flows of communication which 
are necessarily referred to as ‘live’ (since liveness is a category, its use is embedded in 
contexts that are largely habitual), but rather emergent ways of coordinating 
communications and bodies across time and space which, like ‘liveness’ proper, 
involve (more or less) simultaneity, yet not an institutional ‘centre’ of transmission. 
Two fundamental shifts in information and communications technologies in the past 
decade threaten, prima facie, to destabilise liveness in the sense considered so far.  
 
The first is what we could call ‘online liveness’: social co-presence on a variety of 
scales from very small groups in chatrooms to huge international audiences for 
breaking news on major websites, all made possible by the Internet as an underlying 
infrastructure. Often, online liveness overlaps with the existing category of liveness, 
for example, websites linked to reality TV programmes such as Big Brother which 
simply offer an alternative outlet for material that could in principle have been 
broadcast on television, if there had been an audience to justify it.  Online liveness 
here is simply an extension of traditional liveness across media, not a new way of 
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coordinating social experience. But, since the communications space of the Internet is 
effectively infinite, any number of ‘live’ transmissions can go on in parallel without 
interfering with each other: alongside live streaming of long-anticipated events on 
websites (major sporting events) and news-site coverage of breaking news exist 
chatrooms on myriad different sites that link smaller groups of people. All of these 
involve simultaneous co-presence of an audience, but in the latter case there is no 
liveness in the traditional sense - that is, a plausible connection to a centre of 
transmission. What if the latter type of online liveness increasingly dominates 
people’s trajectories as media consumers? This ‘liveness’ would involve no central 
connection mirroring Pierre Levy’s (1997) characterisation of cyberculture as 
‘universality without totality’. It is impossible yet to assess the likelihood of this shift, 
as the Internet’s contrasting tendencies towards fragmentation and concentration are 
played out. Much, including the Internet’s capacity to deliver advertising audiences to 
fund continued media production, will depend on the outcome.  
 
The second rival form of ‘liveness’ we might call ‘group liveness’, but it would not 
seem, at first sight, to overlap at all with traditional liveness since it starts from the co-
presence of a social group, not the co-presence of an audience dispersed around an 
institutional centre. I mean here the ‘liveness’ of a mobile group of friends who are in 
continuous contact via their mobile phones through calls and texting. Peer-group 
presence is, of course, hardly new, but its continuous mediation through shared access 
to a communications infrastructure whose entry-points are themselves mobile, and 
therefore can be permanently open, is new. It enables individuals and groups to be 
continuously co-present to each other even as they move independently across space. 
This transformation of social space may override individuals’ passage between sites 
of fixed media access, as when school friends continue to text each other, when they 
get home, enter their bedroom and switch on their computer. As well as being a 
significant extension of social group dynamics, group liveness offers to the 
commercial interests that maintain the mobile telephony network an expanded space 
for centralised transmission of services and advertising. We return here to the 
ambiguity of original telephony which served as a limited broadcasting system 
(Marvin, 1987) before it became exclusively an instrument of interpersonal 
communication, but mobile phone use may not stabilise towards one use rather than 
the other, in the way fixed telephony did. Whatever happens, the result will affect the 
context in which traditional liveness – individual communication to a socially 
legitimated point of central transmission – is understood. 
 
Liveness and Habitus 
 
These last remarks – about how liveness’s significance as a category may be changed 
by other shifts in how communication flows are becoming embedded in social 
interaction – have been speculative, but in conclusion let me anchor them in some 
reflections on their empirical consequences. Social categories, in Durkheim’s sense, 
are in one way abstract (they are abstracted in analysis from the flow of social life), 
but in another they are quite concrete, since they only work by being embedded in the 
thought and action of situated agents. This is especially true of Pierre Bourdieu’s 
development of Durkheim’s work through the concept of Mauss, Durkheim’s 
collaborator: habitus. For habitus addresses the level at which embodied dispositions 
(particularly dispositions to classify the world in social action) are generated by 
structural features of that same social world. Tracing how the weight of ‘liveness’ as a 
 6
social category might be changing is part of asking how the ‘habitus’ of contemporary 
societies is being transformed by mediation itself. 
 
This is, of course, a huge topic, but I hope at least to establish some starting-points. 
Some contextual remarks about Bourdieu’s work are necessary, since it has been 
appropriated in media sociology piecemeal over the years rather than systematically. 
There are many ways of approaching Bourdieu, but one of the most promising is 
through a concept neglected in almost all media sociology: habitus. For it is here that 
Bourdieu, following a philosophical path out of phenomenology, addresses how 
agents’ dispositions to act are themselves formed out of preexisting social contexts, a 
question that, as Nick Crossley argues, is ‘one of the most fundamental phenomena 
that sociology can address’ (Crossley, 2001: 4).  
 
In recent years habitus has received increasing attention as a concept (Crossley, 2001; 
McNay, 2001; Calhoun, 1995: chapter 5), although it has also received a fair amount 
of unsympathetic criticism (for example Alexander, 1995). It has been most 
frequently applied, if at all, in media sociology in its form of class-specific habitus in 
connection with Bourdieu’s sociology of taste (Bourdieu, 1984). This, however, is not 
the most interesting usage of habitus for us here. For habitus is fortunately not tied to 
Bourdieu’s controversial belief that the taste dispositions of social classes are shaped 
decisively by the early differences in their material conditions of existence; it can also 
be used more generally to understand the range of ‘generative structures’ (McNay, 
1999: 100) that shape dispositions. Even if a problem with Bourdieu’s account of 
class-specific habitus in the arena of taste is that it ignores how mass media have 
aided the de-differentiation of taste boundaries (Wynne and O’Connor, 1998), there is 
huge scope for investigating how media might have changed the fundamental 
conditions under which dispositions of all kinds are generated.  
 
Bourdieu’s overall neglect of media has often been noted (this is a fundamental issue 
in assessing his account of how contemporary societies hold together: Calhoun, 1995: 
155), but it is especially striking when we reflect on his early definition of habitus in 
this general sense as ‘a general transposable disposition which carries out a systematic 
universal application . . . . of the necessity inherent in the learning conditions [of 
social action]’ (Bourdieu, 1984: 170, added emphasis). Media are clearly relevant to 
how children learn about the contemporary world, including its temporal and social 
organisation, so mediation should surely be central to rethinking habitus. If we 
consider one of Bourdieu’s best-known analyses of how habitus works in traditional 
societies, the analysis of the Berber House (reprinted in Bourdieu, 1990), the 
mechanism is the structuring of domestic space. But no one can ignore media’s role in 
structuring contemporary domestic space, embedded in the walls of today’s living-
spaces as our ‘window’ onto the distant social world. What is difficult is to capture 
the sheer breadth and compelxity of how media might work as habitus, that is, as a 
‘materialised system of classification’ (Bourdieu 1990: 76, added emphasis). 
Fortunately, in his most developed writing on habitus, Bourdieu is open to the 
contribution of representations, especially those through which ‘the group presents 
itself as such’ to itself (1990: 108). Media, of course, involve both types of 
structuring: the prior structuring of the spaces in which we live and become subjects, 
and the representations in which we recognise ourselves as groups. Liveness, indeed, 
as a category of media, marks the media’s constructed role as the access-point to what 
is supposed to be ‘central’ to the ‘group’, that is, the whole society. So the link of 
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liveness to the organisation of social behaviour passes quite naturally through the 
concept of habitus.  
 
This point can be traced to all three types of liveness discussed earlier. Traditional 
‘liveness’ is written into daily habits which embody our dependencies on media 
flows: for example, the regular watching of a television news bulletin at least once 
every evening or the habit of many, including myself, of being woken daily by an 
alarm-radio offering the latest live news. The decentralised form of online liveness 
characterises Internet use where new forms of public sociality may be emerging, 
sometimes in circumstances where the existence of relevant ‘peers’ itself has to be 
generated outside existing social networks: see Orgad (forthcoming) on online self-
help groups for breast cancer sufferers. Mobile-phone-based ‘group liveness’ – and its 
extension into the individual users’ sense of themselves as permanently available for 
contact – is already being translated into embodied forms of responsibility best 
analysed in terms of habitus. Take this quotation from an unemployed single mother 
living in North London: 
 
‘I always have my phone with me . . . and it is always on. Last week I popped out 
to the shop on the corner here and forgot my phone. Half-way down [the street] I 
turned back to get it. The shop is only two minutes away but I still came back . . .’ 
(quoted Crabtree, Nathan and Roberts, 2003: 29). 
 
The test in all this is to trace how categories of thought come together to organise 
dispositions and through them specific practices. Liveness, in its most general sense 
of continuous connectedness, is hardly likely to disappear as a prized feature of 
contemporary media, because it is a category closely linked to media’s role in the 
temporal and spatial organisation of the social world. The category ‘liveness’ helps to 
shape the disposition to remain ‘connected’ in all its forms, even though as we have 
seen the types of liveness are now pulling in different directions. It might seem that, 
by broadening our consideration of liveness this far, we have lost the specificity that 
made it such a compelling term in academic writing on media and in everyday media 
discourse. I hope however to have shown that the opposite is true: it is only by 
understanding the tangled web of social categories in which mediated liveness is 
lodged that we can understand, in turn, why debates about liveness in media research 
will continue to have wider resonances for the foreseeable future.  
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1
 On the use of ‘the media’ to refer to those media constructed as society’s ‘central’ media, see XXXX 
(2000: 6), Gitlin (2001). 
